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# **State Aid and Regional Airports**

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Disclaimer (EN): the views expressed cannot be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission



# Air transport in the EU – some figures


- More than 450 airports
- 150 scheduled airlines
- 822 million passengers transported to and from EU airports
- 60 air navigation providers
- Sector contributes approx. EUR 140 bln to EU GDP
- 2.3 million employees in the aviation sector





(2011 figures)


Sources: Eurostat, AEA, IATA Steer Davies Gleave (2012)

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## Rationale for state support to airports

- Infrastructure is a complement for many other activities
  - Externalities on other activities not captured by market investor
  - Coordination effect for economic activity
- Cohesion perspective
- à Potential justifications for state intervention (incl. state aid)



## Distortions of competition and trade

- Effects on competition in infrastructure investment: state aid may cause distortions
  - Rent shifting
  - Overcapacity
  - Impact on dynamic incentives
- Subsidy races between airports/regions in attracting airlines
  - Low cost carrier (LCC) induced airport competition has turned excessive, cf. systematic operating losses airports
  - Soft budget constraints exacerbate the problem and lead to overly generous contracts
- Effects on competition between airlines (plus other forms of transport)



## Draft Guidelines – main proposals

- 1. Investment aid to airports
- 2. Operating aid to airports
- 3. Aid to airlines



#### Investment aid to airports

- Additional capacity is to meet medium-term demand in the catchment area and should not lead to duplication of unprofitable infrastructure
  - Negative presumption when in catchment area of other airport
- Need for aid to be demonstrated on the basis of a "funding gap" calculation (business plan)
- Proportionality of aid: aid capped by maximum aid intensities


	Size of the airport	Max. aid intensity
	> 5 million	0%
	3-5 million	up to 25%
	1-3 million	up to 50%
	< 1 million	Up to 75%

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#### Operating aid to airports

- Allow smaller airports (< 3 million passengers/year) a transition period of up to 10 years to reach operational cost coverage
  - Forward looking approach, taking capital costs as given (sunk)
- Ensure the tightening of soft budget constraints by using fixed lump sum subsidy
  - To limit excessive competition between airports/regions, avoiding unnecessary losses
  - Amount to be determined on the basis of an ex ante business plan showing the way towards full operating cost coverage (not taking into account capital costs) during a transitional period
- Operating aid prohibited after the end of the transitional period





# Proposed approach in Draft Guidelines

- There is no aid to airlines if:
  - 1. The price charged for the airport services corresponds to the market price
    - Benchmarking (difficult at present)
  - 2. The airport/airline contract is profitable on an incremental basis
    - Context: requirement on airport to cover operational costs after transitional period (and lump sum approach during transitional period)





## Annex

Draft Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines – available at

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/20 13\_aviation\_guidelines/index\_en.html

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