Comments on the issues paper on the preliminary findings of the sector inquiry on new media (3G) Brussels, 27 May 2005

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## General outlook

- Positive appreciation of the sector inquiry and the issues paper.
- General agreement with the analysis of the Commission on:
  - The distinction between two scenarios (DG: main concern is scenario 1)
  - Market definition (DG: markets should be defined quite narrowly because premium sport content has no substitute)
  - Platform substituability (DG: agree with the Commission that there is little substituability between TV broadcast and transmission over mobile networks)

#### **Competition problems**

#### Exclusivity

Cross-platform bundling of rights
Pricing concerns
Coverage restrictions
Vertical and horizontal integration

# Exclusivity

- The pay-TV market has shown that exclusivity creates severe foreclosure effects. The Commission has rightly intervened to limit the scope and length of exclusivity for football rights (see UEFA decision)
- In nascent markets such as the delivery of premium sport content over 3G, exclusivity should be limited even to a greater extent

### Cross-platform bundling of rights

- Cross-platform bundling of rights should be discouraged
- The benefits of such bundling are unclear, whereas the restrictions of competition it generates are serious
- Bundling allows the acquirer of the bundled rights to become a gatekeeper, which could prevent the development of 3G services to protect its own platform or extract monopoly rents from 3G operators
- Sub-licensing to 3G operators is no equivalent to the direct acquisition of rights by such operators

# Pricing concerns

Pricing of 3G rights is an issue which will have a central impact on (i) the development of 3G services and (ii) the level of competition between providers of 3G services

The lump sum approach should be discouraged because it creates barriers to entry. Launching 3G services is already a risky business. Forcing operators to pay large sums on an *ex ante* basis makes the provision of such services even riskier. The revenue sharing model should be privileged.

## **Coverage restrictions**

 Such restrictions create barriers to entry and it is hard to see a proper justification for them

 The existence of technical limitations provides no justification for coverage restrictions as one should let the market decides what can or cannot be shown on 3G

#### Vertical and horizontal integration

Vertical integration between content owners and pay-TV operators is a source of concern as it may create disincentives to sell rights to 3G operators, thereby affecting the development of such services

 Horizontal integration between telecommunications incumbents providing pay-TV services through ADSL and 3G operators may also be a source of concern as it could affect competition in the 3G services market. This shows again the risks of cross-platform bundling of rights Contact Damien Geradin Global Competition Law Centre College of Europe, Bruges E-mail: dgeradin@gclc.coleurop.be